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Institutional Culture of Mergers
and Alliances in South Africa
Martin Hall
8.1 Introduction
South Africa’s extensive set of higher education mergers were implemented
between 2002 and 2005. While there has not been a systematic evaluation of this
merger process, that created 11 new institutions from 26 merger partners and
affected 62 % of the South African higher education system (in terms of current
student registrations), a full set of independent and rigorous quality assurance
reports provide the basis for evaluating the consequences of the policy. These
institutional audits suggest three broad types of outcome: mergers that have resulted
in well functioning new institutions, failed mergers, and a set of new universities
that are still responding to the consequences of merger. Finally, the publication of
South Africa’s new National Development Plan in 2012 and a new analysis of
student access and success across the country’s public higher education system as a
whole, completed in 2013, allow an assessment of the degree to which the objec-
tives of the 2002 merger plan have been achieved.
South African society is shaped by three centuries of racial segregation. This was
formalized as apartheid in 1948 when the National Party assumed power. The first
democratic elections were held in 1994, and 2 years later a new constitution
embedded a Bill of Rights that included the principle of equal access to education,
and the imperative of redress for the consequence of previous unfair discrimination.
Translating these formal rights into substantive opportunities has required the
comprehensive reconstruction of a wide range of organizations, including the
country’s Higher Education institutions. The newly-elected government had
inherited an education system shaped by segregation in terms of race, ethnicity
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and language; a bewildering array that ranged from the conventional to the barely
functional. Following an extensive series of commissions, reports and inquiries, the
Minister for Education announced in 2002 an extensive and mandatory process of
mergers (Hall et al. 2004a).
As part of this merger process, the Council on Higher Education (a statutory
body charged with advising the Minister) commissioned a study on the governance
of mergers. This work, which was later published, provided a window on the
merger process at a key stage of planning and implementation (see Hall
et al. 2004a; also Hall et al. 2002, 2004b; Hall and Symes 2003, 2005).
The chapter that follows here provides an overview of the discourse of the
merger process in late 2002 and early 2003, and perceptions of these mergers
over the decade that has followed. This is neither a comprehensive report on
South Africa’s Higher Education reconstruction or a systematic analysis of the
consequences. It does, however, point to some key outcomes of this unique
experiment in restructuring a university system at the national level by means of
a mandated set of processes, rather than through voluntary arrangements.
The extent to which South Africa’s 2002 merger plan has succeeded after the
first decade can be assessed by asking three sets of questions. Firstly, and at the
systemic level, has the reorganization of the national higher education system
broken the “structural embrace” of apartheid architecture? Has the merger process
contributed to addressing South Africa’s overall labour force requirements? Sec-
ond, at the level of the individual institution, which sets of conditions that were
discernable at the beginning of the merger process in 2002 appear to have driven
degrees of success over the following decade? How have the new types of institu-
tion envisaged in 2002 fared over the following decade? Third, from the perspective
of students and their interests, to what extent has the merger process contributed to
addressing access to Higher Education and subsequent levels of graduations? To
what extent are South African universities open on merit, irrespective of race or
socioeconomic class?
As Njabulo Ndebele, previously Vice-Chancellor of two very different
South African universities, put it in the introduction to the key review of
South African Higher Education that was released in 2013:
In moments of great historic transitions the world over, extremes of action are normal.
Corrective in their intent, they are part of the logic of change. The ascendant power requires
‘its own people’ in large numbers to replace those that had kept going the passing old order.
Statistics and quantification of the progress of change carry political import. They can
validate or invalidate the new political order. Because they become part of the definition of
success or failure, they bear consequences. Woe unto the new order that does not pay
attention to them (Council on Higher Education 2013a).
8.2 Context
The merger plan that was approved by the South African government in 2002 has to
be understood in the context of both the long years of formal segregation and of the
broader policy imperatives that faced the newly-elected administration from 1994
onwards.
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Apartheid legislation and practice had resulted in a unique combination of
Higher Education governance arrangements, ranging from institutional autonomy
in the British tradition for universities intended as reserved for white students (for
example, the University of Cape Town, the University of the Witwatersrand), to
direct government control in what were in effect extensions of a segregated civil
service (for example, the University of Bophuthatswana, later renamed the Univer-
sity of the North-West, and the University of Transkei). Complicating things further
was a binary division between vocational provision (technikons) and a bilateral
distinction between Afrikaans medium institutions (such as the University of
Pretoria and Technikon Port Elizabeth) and English medium provision (for exam-
ple, Rhodes University and Cape Technikon).
Spatial segregation had been a formative aspect of South Africa’s history for
well over a century, enforced through legislation such as the Natives Land Act of
1913 and the Group Areas Act of 1950. Not surprisingly, spatial segregation had
left a definitive imprint on the higher education system. By the end of the apartheid
era there were three, racially-defined education administrations (for Whites,
Coloureds and Indians) and multiple, ethnically-defined “homeland” administra-
tions for Africans, the origins of universities such as Bophuthatswana, Venda and
Zululand.
Whether institutions had a history of legal autonomy or of direct control, the
State carried a substantial burden through funding a significant proportion of
teaching and research costs and, increasingly after 1994, of providing student
funding support through the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS).
Not surprisingly, there was a prevalent assumption that the country’s entire Higher
Education system was unfit for purpose for a post-apartheid South Africa (National
Commission on Higher Education 1996).
There had been a long tradition of critique and active opposition to this segre-
gated and discriminatory system. The eventual shape of a normalized Higher
Education policy began to take form through the National Education Policy Inves-
tigation and its wide-ranging sets of reports (NEPI 1993) and the work of the
National Commission on Higher Education between 1995 and 1996 (National
Commission on Higher Education 1996). This led in turn to the key 1997 White
Paper, which set out the principles for an open, non-discriminatory Higher Educa-
tion system and which remains a key benchmark today (South African Government
1997a).
Following reports by the Council on Higher Education (a statutory body) and a
National Commission on Higher Education, the government announced in 2002 a
comprehensive set of compulsory mergers that would restructure South Africa’s
Higher Education system and reduce the apartheid legacy of 36 universities,
technikons and institutes to 23 universities within the following 3 years (Council
on Higher Education 2000, 2002; Hall et al. 2002; South African Government 2001,
2002a). This is summarized in Table 8.1.
The outcome of the merger process was three types of institutions: “traditional”
universities, universities of technology (previously technikons, offering
vocationally-oriented qualifications) and “comprehensive” universities (intended
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Table 8.1 The restructuring of South African higher education
Traditional universities
24,772 University of Cape Town Unchanged
10741 University of Fort Hare Amalgamated with part of
Rhodes University
29,901 University of the Free State Unchanged
41,224 University of KwaZulu-Natal University of Natal January 2004
University of Durban-Westville
18,205 University of Limpopo University of the North January 2005
Medical University of
South Africa
55,732 North-West University Potchefstroom University for
Christian Higher Education
January 2004
University of the North-West
57,114 University of Pretoria Unchanged
7,169 Rhodes University Campus surrendered to Fort Hare
27,344 University of Stellenbosch Unchanged
18,059 University of the Western Cape Unchanged
29,498 University of the Witwatersrand Unchanged
Comprehensive Universities
48,315 University of Johannesburg Rand Afrikaans University January 2005
Vista University Distance Edu-
cation campus
Technikon Witwatersrand
26,119 Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University
University of Port Elizabeth January 2005
Technikon Port Elizabeth
293,437 University of South Africa University of South Africa January 2004
Technikon SA
Vista University Distance Edu-
cation campus
10,679 University of Venda Unchanged
26,734 Walter Sisulu University of
Technology and Science
University of Transkei January 2005
Border Technikon
Eastern Cape Technikon
14,725 University of Zululand Unchanged
Universities of Technology
32,167 Cape Peninsula University of
Technology
Peninsula Technikon January 2005
Cape Technikon
12,583 Central University of
Technology
Unchanged
25,184 Durban University of
Technology
ML Sultan Technikon 2002
Natal Technikon





to offer a combination of academic and vocational qualifications). Twelve institu-
tions would emerge largely untouched by the merger process, despite the earlier
conclusion of the National Commission on Higher Education that no existing
institution was fit for purpose. One merger had almost been completed voluntarily
at the time that the government approved the overall policy, and the remaining ten
would originate in a merger process in two phases, to be completed by January 2004
and January 2005 (South African Government 2002b).
It was in this context that the Council on Higher Education decided to commis-
sion additional research into the governance implications of institutional mergers
and incorporations – the basis for the perspective presented here. In late 2002 and
through the first half of 2003, nine institutions were visited, documentation col-
lected and interviews with leadership and senior management conducted. The
sample covered the full range of existing institutions, both by type and geographical
location. The report was completed in June 2003 and published in August 2004
(Hall et al. 2004b).
At the time of this research, only one merger had been completed (between the
M. L. Sultan and Natal Technikons, combined as the Durban Institute of Technol-
ogy in April 2002, later renamed the Durban University of Technology). Those at
the institutions visited who had been in intense discussions about mergers and
merger processes for more than a year, knew their own broad trajectories, with
projected mergers either the following year or 18 months into the future. But many
aspects of process, resourcing and other details were unclear or unknown. Given
this, a primary value of this work was as a record of the uncertainties and ambigu-
ities that are inevitable in the gap between the development and implementation of
system-level policies, and the pragmatics and consequences of implementation at
the institutional level. The decisions and accommodations made in this “gap” have
had a significant influence on the institutional forms that were to emerge, and which
shape South Africa’s Higher Education today.
8.3 Responses from the Front Line
A merger process can usefully be understood as having three phases: a pre-merger
phase, a transitional or interim phase, and a post-merger integration phase (follow-
ing Goedegebuure 1992; Eastman and Lang 2001). In the requirements set out in
Table 8.1 (continued)
Traditional universities
51,785 Tshwane University of
Technology
Pretoria Technikon January 2004
Technikon Northern Gauteng
North-West Technikon
21,416 Vaal University of Technology Unchanged
982,936 Total undergraduate student
headcount enrolment, 2011
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South Africa’s Higher Education Act, the pre-merger phase begins when the
Minister gives written notice of the intention to merge two or more institutions,
and opens a 90-day period for representations to be made. Following this, the
Minister gives official notice that the merger will proceed, initiating the transitional
phase of the process (South African Government 1997b). Institutional visits and
interviews all took place in this transitional phase. During this time, which lasts
between 6 months and a year, the Minister appoints an Interim Council which, in
turn, appoints interim management. The post-merger phase begins when the Interim
Council surrenders authority to the incoming Council of the newly formed
university.
Despite the specifications of the Higher Education Act, there were ambiguities in
interpretation and omissions of detail (Hall et al. 2004a). The voluntary merger of
M. L. Sultan and Natal Technikons had proved difficult, with legal challenges,
industrial disputes and considerable negative publicity (Chetty 2010). In the long
period of uncertainty prior to the conclusion of the formal period of pre-merger
representations in December 2002, there had been a considerable degree of political
positioning by the affected institutions. For example, the geographically adjacent
University of the Western Cape and the Peninsula Technikon had objected to the
suggestion that they should merge to form a “comprehensive university”; the
University of the Western Cape was exempted from merger while the Peninsula
Technikon was merged with the Cape Technikon despite objections, forming a new
“university of technology” with widely separate campuses. There had also been an
abrasive, public, dispute between the Minister and the leadership of the University
of South Africa, a distance education provider that objected to being merged with
other elements of South Africa’s distance provision (Hall et al. 2004a).
By early 2003, when the interviews were conducted, there was a general
acceptance that mergers would go ahead, considerable confusion about what to
expect, and realism about the need to take advantage of any opportunity to achieve
the best possible outcome. At the beginning of the year, the Ministry of Education
had written to all institutions affected by the merger process requiring, by June
2003, notification of the name, physical location and proposed start date for the
newly-formed university, details of the process that would be followed to comply
with labour legislation, and nominations for membership of the Interim Council
(Hall et al. 2004a).
Given that there were no precedents, and scant guidelines, as to how these key
decisions were to be made ahead of the installations of the new Interim Councils,
pragmatism was the order of the day. Most institutions had set up internal merger
processes and joint merger committees with their mandated partners. Merger
committees were usually supported by task teams and merger managers, looking
ahead to the requirements that would be faced by joint merger committees and
Interim Councils as the transitional phase gathered momentum. Task teams were
charged with specific areas such as academic administration, human resources,
student services, information technology and buildings and infrastructure. Merger
managers, often senior administrators or senior academics on secondment, always
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worked closely with the Vice-Chancellor or Rector. Their primary responsibilities
were coordination, change management and communication (Hall et al. 2004a).
Not surprisingly, there was at this time an overwhelming concern with practi-
calities, both because of the enormity of the merger challenge and because,
throughout the merger processes, institutions were expected to continue to offer
their full suites of academic programmes to their currently registered students, and
to recruit new cohorts of students for the academic year that would begin in early
2004. In particular, there were significant anxieties about the financing of the
merger process and the extent of the capacity for change. National budget provision
was seen as too little and too late. Independent estimates had put the sectoral costs
of the merger exercise at between ZAR4.8bn and ZAR5.7bn ($600 m to $710 m at
the prevailing rate of exchange). In December 2002, the government was reported
to have set aside ZAR3.1bn ($380 m), and the national budget for 2003 allocated
only ZAR800m ($100 m) for each of the following 3 years (Hall et al. 2004a).
A further concern was compliance with labour legislation. Despite the fact that
COSATU, South Africa’s federation of trade unions, was formally part of the ANC
government and committed to the restructuring of apartheid-era institutions, there
had been significant challenges to the voluntary merger between M. L. Sultan and
Natal Technikons by trade unions, resulting in court action. In many cases, univer-
sity and technikon campuses were among the largest local employers and any
efficiency process that removed jobs would have a significant impact on local
economies and livelihoods. In a reflection of the government’s political sensitivity
to labour-related issues, the Higher Education Act had been amended in 2002 to
require that all contracts of employment be transferred automatically to the merged
institution, while at the same time allowing that pre-merger rationalization could
take place in the terms of the existing Labour Relations Act (South African
Government 2002b). Merging institutions were left to navigate the evident com-
plexity of this legal framework.
Taken together, Councils, institutional leaders, merger committees and merger
managers were faced with the formidable task of completing a broad set of due
diligence requirements ahead of passing the baton to incoming Interim Councils
and interim managers for the newly formed universities. They were expected to
identify, audit, verify and disclose the assets, liabilities and obligations, systems
and controls of the merging institutions, as well as deal with political complexities
that ranged from labour relations to the often deeply-felt question of the name by
which the new university would be known. In some cases – and as a consequence of
the geographical segregation that had been a distinctive feature of apartheid – these
processes had to be managed across campuses that were widely distributed. Some
were spread across metropolitan regions (Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town)
or, in some cases, were hundreds of kilometres apart (for example, the merging
University of the North-West and Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher
Education).
Looming behind these immediate concerns – and the Minister’s requirements for
a set of specific outcomes by mid-2003 – was substantial unease about the educa-
tional mission (and therefore the academic viability) of the 11 new universities that
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would emerge from the merger process. All who were interviewed believed that due
diligence should extend to key issues in academic and institutional planning,
including academic programme and course structures (and duplication of courses
across institutions), qualification levels of staff, equity profiles of staff and students,
student throughput rates and student fee levels. But the practical ability to do this
varied greatly according to the magnitude of specific circumstances and resource
capacity.
In addition, in restructuring the Higher Education system as a whole, the state
had created a new type of institution, the “comprehensive university”. While this
was evidently intended to serve where a former technikon was to merge with a
previous university (four of the new comprehensive universities would have this
heritage), two unchanged institutions were also now designated as comprehensive
universities (the Universities of Venda and of Zululand). At the headline level it
was apparent that comprehensive universities were to offer both vocational and
academic qualifications, seeking to achieve appropriate overall balance in the range
of qualifications attained and avoiding “mission drift”, whereby higher-status
degree programmes were favoured at the expense of the mix of vocational quali-
fications required for overall economic development. However, there were no
established principles or guidelines for how curricula should be structured or
qualification frameworks implemented. Given that the state had the direct authority
to steer the higher education system as a whole, in authorizing or withholding the
recognition of qualifications and institutional funding through teaching grants, there
were evident implications for the future viability of universities in this new cate-
gory. However, given contingent demands, short time scales and resource con-
straints, there was often little that institutional leaders could do to address these
issues (Hall et al. 2004a).
All those interviewed believed that integrating the academic functions of the
newly-formed universities – whatever their type – would be a long and difficult
process. Firstly, it would not be possible to introduce a new set of academic
programmes for the launch date of the new university (at the beginning of either
the 2004 or 2005 academic years). In addition, “pipeline” students already enrolled
would have to be taught through to the completion of their curricula; given the low
throughput levels for South African Higher Education, this could only be completed
4 years after merger, at the earliest (in 2008 or 2009). During this period of
transition, it would in some cases be necessary to offer two sets of academic
programmes at the same time, but without additional resources. Further, and as in
all universities, changes to the profiles of academic programmes on offer would
require extensive changes in administrative and professional staffing, in the com-
position and qualification levels of academic staff and in physical resources (Hall
et al. 2004a).
Despite these concerns, in all cases the transitional phase of the merger process
was completed and the newly-merged universities were launched, as planned, at the
beginning of either the 2004 or the 2005 academic years.
152 M. Hall
8.4 Post-merger: A Decade of Integration
Despite the evident complexity of South Africa’s project for Higher Education
restructuring – and its high political, social and economic stakes – there has been no
formal, comprehensive review of its outcomes. However, the audit reports carried
out under the auspices of the Higher Education Quality Committee provide a
considered set of perspectives on the outcomes of the merger process (Council on
Higher Education 2013b). These have been completed for all but one of the new
universities created by mergers, and have been conducted to a rigorous and com-
prehensive standard by panels of independent reviewers. While the HEQC’s pri-
mary remit is the quality of teaching and research, all the audit reports also provide
the viewpoint of the panel on the outcomes of merger. These reports are
complemented by the narrower remit of the Higher Education Merger Study
Group, which has been independently funded to provide continuity between the
2001 National Working Group and the outcomes of its recommendations (Gillard
et al. 2012). Taken together, these reports provide the basis for a rough, threefold
typology of institutional circumstances over the years, that followed the implemen-
tation of mergers.
Firstly, HEQC audit reports see four mergers as broadly successful: Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan University, the University of Johannesburg, North-West
University and the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
The HEQC’s audit of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University was carried out
in 2008 and commended “the speed and effectiveness” of implementing operational
measures, management structures and stable governance, while also noting some
degree of staff demoralization that had damaged the quality of teaching (Council on
Higher Education 2009a). The Higher Education Merger Study Group agreed with
this assessment, noting that the new university “moved quickly to draw large
numbers of people into developing policies and structures” and that “when staff
of merged academic departments worked together, the department often benefited”.
Nevertheless, “different academic requirements and cultures [. . .] were often inten-
sified when they remained on separate sites [. . .]”. Incomplete issues included
remuneration anomalies and the “academic shape” of the new university, particu-
larly the future of vocational and diploma programmes (Gillard et al. 2012. See also
Van Straaten Theron and Dodd 2011).
The HEQC visited the University of Johannesburg in the following year, where a
different audit panel found that there had been “a radical organizational redesign
and renewal process” that had included “considerable financial and human
resources investment directed at amplifying (the university’s) teaching and learning
capacity” as well as “movement towards equalising infrastructure across cam-
puses”. As a result, “the institution appears considerably settled in relation to the
operational aspects of the merger and is now in a position to embark on the task of
giving expression to its mission and vision”. Most staff members interviewed told
the HEQC panel that the merger had been successful in producing a new institu-
tional identity, although “in general, academic staff members still think in terms of
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the old technikon and university divide, especially with regard to programme
offerings” (Council on Higher Education 2010a).
The Higher Education Merger Study Group’s report for the University of
Johannesburg adds more detail to the HEQC panel’s comments. “Perhaps the
biggest challenge”, the Study Group concluded, was “the coexistence of degrees
and ex-technikon diplomas in the same institution” (Gillard et al. 2012; see also
Goldman 2012).
North-West University was also audited by the HEQC in 2009. Here, the panel
made particular note of the challenge in bringing together three campuses across
two provinces, separated from one another by a distance of at least 200 km. Given
this, the audit panel commended the notable progress made across a wide range of
merger requirements, but also noted “issues of student and staff profile, institutional
culture and programme alignment” and that “the vast disparities between the
campuses, for instance in infrastructure, resources and staffing, continue to exist”.
The merger could not be regarded as complete until “students receive comparable
levels and quality of programmes on all three campuses” (Council on Higher
Education 2010b).
Evaluating progress at the new University of KwaZulu-Natal is complicated by
the Council on Higher Education’s decision not to publish the HEQC’s report from
the 2008 audit.1 This deficit is, in part, mediated by the work of the Higher
Education Merger Study Group. This report notes that there had been “daunting
challenges” facing the merging institutions, and that the new university had over
40,000 students and over 4,000 staff, with several large campuses. A four-College
model had been adopted to give the 56 academic schools coherence, but “disad-
vantages also surfaced”: “decision-making was often duplicated, because of the
additional layer between faculties and Senate. The spread of activities over so many
campuses inevitably prevented easy contact between people”. At the Study Group’s
last visit to the university, in 2007, a range of staffing issues was unresolved, and
consolidation of academic programmes was incomplete: “some academic areas had
taken the opportunity to revamp curricula. Others, whether because of various
complications or active or covert resistance, had been less successful” (Gillard
et al. 2012).
While the unpublished HEQC audit report cannot be cited, long-standing ten-
sions, that have characterized the new university since its inception, are a matter of
public record and have centred on disciplinary action taken against two members of
the University Senate after they tabled a critical report (McKune 2009). Neverthe-
less, it is apparent that the new University of KwaZulu-Natal has been successful in
1 I was the Chair of the HEQC audit panel for the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2008, and
endorsed the report that the HEQC submitted to the Council on Higher Education. The audit was
abandoned by the Council when confidential correspondence concerning the conduct of the
University’s leadership was made public, and following the intervention in the audit process by
the Vice-Chancellor. The audit report, while completed and endorsed by the audit panel, has yet to
be released by the CHE. See Brooks (2011) for an account of this affair.
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implementing its formative merger and through the following phase of
consolidation.
These four, favourably reviewed, institutions have a number of features in
common. Each has included a “historically advantaged” institution previously of
university status (the University of Port Elizabeth, Rand Afrikaans University,
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education and the University of
Natal). Each was able to move quickly and effectively to integrate, as far as was
possible, a new organizational and operational structure. All, though, still faced
considerable challenges in bringing the full range of their newly-combined staff
with them in identifying with the new institution and its mission and purpose, and in
integrating and aligning academic programmes across the new institution.
Secondly, and in striking contrast, are HEQC reports on two problematic merger
outcomes: the University of Limpopo and the Walter Sisulu University of Tech-
nology and Science.
The HEQC audit of the Walter Sisulu University of Technology and Science was
delayed by problems at the institution, finally taking place in 2011. The panel found
that there were widely divergent views on the mission and purpose of the university.
Their report described the merger as “a difficult and painful process, with signifi-
cant resistance to the merger by staff, significant under-resourcing, weak financial
management, and on-going fragmentation and lack of institutional coherence across
campuses”. Poor management of the merger process had adversely affected staff
morale. There were “many outstanding matters which must be resolved urgently,
including the finalisation of the organisational structure, harmonisation of processes
and systems, development of plans for financial sustainability, regularisation of
staff contracts and job descriptions to ensure equitable service conditions, and
implementation of a performance management system”. Unless these issues were
addressed immediately, the panel reported, “the success of WSU, including educa-
tional quality and its sustainability as a higher education institution will be put at
high risk” (Council on Higher Education 2011b).
Indeed, the Minister immediately appointed an Independent Assessor who
reported in graphic detail: “an institution in crisis, riddled with conflict, mistrust
and disaffection among its stakeholders. There is complete loss of confidence in
university leadership [. . .] There are constant conflicts and battles between
employees and management, as well as between students and management, incur-
ring frequent strikes by workers and class boycotts by students. Labour unrest has
included ‘Staff hostage taking, victimization of students, eviction of staff from
offices and lecture rooms, locking out of staff, seizing of university keys and
locking up of university buildings, abandoning of work stations by staff, closing
and barricading of access entrances to the institution’ [. . .] Student uprisings have
included arson (the torching of university buses) and other acts of violence. There is
a pervasive disregard for rules and authority, and an air of anarchy rules within the
institution” (South African Government 2011c). Following this report, the Council
and Vice-Chancellor were suspended by the Minister, who in October 2011 used his
authority in terms of the Higher Education Act to place the university under the
control of an Administrator, reporting directly to him.
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The HEQC audit of the University of Limpopo had been completed in 2010, and
also described comprehensive failures of the new university’s merger mandate. The
university had been formed through the merger of the University of the North and
the Medical University of South Africa (Medunsa) in 2005. Despite the fact that the
campuses of the two institutions are some 300 km apart, a key objective had been to
provide the rural Limpopo province with facilities for training in the health sci-
ences: “not only was this aspect of the merger strongly resisted by Medunsa, it also
led to a large number of resignations among its highly qualified academic staff”.
Further complications had stemmed from the joint funding of medical schools
by the Department of Higher Education and Training and the provincial depart-
ments of health in two different provinces. The overall consequence was the lack of
any appropriate institutional mission or shared purpose in the core functions of
teaching and learning, research and community engagement (Council on Higher
Education 2011a).
Following the HEQC audit, the Minister appointed a task team to investigate and
this team reported in July 2011 (South African Government 2011b; Sidimba 2011).
The conclusion was that “the merger [. . .] has not been successful and should be
undone. The continuation of the merger will not benefit the current programmes of
either campus”. In June 2013, the Department of Higher Education and Training
reported that the two institutions would be unbundled and Medunsa re-established
as an independent university in January 2014 (Phakathi 2013).
In both cases, the unsuccessful mergers lacked a “strong partner”, and the
merging institutions had been facing considerable challenges prior to the merger
process beginning. Neither was able to develop a clear sense of mission or purpose.
Campuses of the new institutions are widely dispersed, in some cases hundreds of
kilometres apart, with no easy transport networks. Both were designed to cater for
students from economically marginalized and low income communities, including
a substantial proportion from rural locations, and were expected to engage with
these communities in addressing severe and extensive challenges of economic
development and the provision of basic facilities.
The third type of outcome of the merger process is where the new universities
are seen in their audit reports as still on track to achieving consolidation and
integration, but where the process was still incomplete when last reviewed. They
do not appear to be facing catastrophic scenarios (such as Walter Sisulu University)
or the reversal of the merger (such as the University of Limpopo). However, they
did not have the evident advantages of universities such as KwaZulu-Natal and
North-West, which entered the merger with the significant assets of a previously
advantaged institution. This group comprises the Durban University of Technology,
Tshwane University of Technology, the University of South Africa, Cape Peninsula
University of Technology and the University of Fort Hare.
When the HEQC audit panel assessed the Durban University of Technology in
2007, it noted that, although established in 2002, it had only been designated as a
University of Technology in 2005. At the point of the audit visit, the university had
just emerged from a period under the direct control of an Administrator, and the
new Vice-Chancellor had only been in office for a few weeks (Council on Higher
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Education 2008b). Chetty has commented that the audit process was itself a
significant contributor to advancing a unity of purpose: “when it became known
that DUT was going to be audited [. . .] staff largely set aside their differences,
which up until then could be associated with the merger. As expressed by several
staff members, the audit had galvanized people into action to portray a united front
and not to let the institution down” (Chetty 2010). In one sense, then, while this had
been an early, voluntary, merger, the process of establishing the identity and
mission of the new university has started later than at other newly-formed
institutions.
The HEQC audit report provided guidelines as to how this integration and
alignment could be achieved. The university should create “the necessary mecha-
nisms and processes for different layers of the institution to engage with its
conceptualisation of ‘university of technology’, identify a developmental trajectory
in relation to the three core functions and draw an implementation plan which
establishes clear milestones, time-frames, responsibilities and performance indica-
tors for the achievement of the goal of becoming a university of technology and its
implications for the definition of quality”. Given its difficult history and conflictual
experiences over the preceding 5 years, the university needed “to develop a shared
institutional culture which is inclusive, transparent and community-oriented [. . .] a
process of organisation building, led by the new Vice Chancellor, needs to take
place in order for staff and students to develop a sense of belonging rooted in the
new identity of DUT” (Council on Higher Education 2008b).
The HEQC Audit of the Tshwane University of Technology was also conducted
in 2007. This new university had been launched through the merger of three
previous technikons: Pretoria Technikon, Technikon Northern Gauteng and
North-West Technikon. The audit report expressed concerns “that issues of ideol-
ogy, race, language and work ethic generally constitute a source of tension among
and between staff”, and that these issues were not being adequately addressed.
There was no apparent sense of a common institutional purpose or new institutional
identity (Council on Higher Education 2008a). In 2009, the Minister appointed a
commission of inquiry into these ongoing problems (the Sithole Commission). The
inquiry concluded that “there is a serious void between Council, the Senate and
the executive management on the one hand, and the employees and students on the
other. This has resulted in constant accusations and counter-accusations, ultima-
tums, demands and resulting strife within the University. The structures which were
created to serve the interest of the employees and students and to assist governance
and management to create an operational environment have become dysfunctional”
(South African Government 2010). Following a further report by an Independent
Assessor, the university was placed under formal administration until 2012, when a
new Council and Vice-Chancellor were appointed.
The post-merger history of the Tshwane University of Technology, then, is
similar to that of the Durban University of Technology: a difficult initial period,
culminating in government intervention and the appointment of an Administrator,
followed by the re-establishment of normal governance and the appointment of a
new leadership team. The challenge facing the new leadership is substantial; more
8 Institutional Culture of Mergers and Alliances in South Africa 157
than 50,000 student registrations and dispersed campuses in four different
provinces, including both urban and rural areas.
The University of South Africa (Unisa) was, and is, different from all the other
new and already established, universities in South Africa. Traditionally a large and
long-established distance provider, it had been adapting to changing circumstances
caused by the availability of new technologies and the emerging needs of its
students. The merger, which had been hotly contested in a public dispute and
court action, was intended to consolidate the existing institution with other ele-
ments of distance provision to create a new form of comprehensive university. This
posed particular challenges. As the HEQC noted in the report on its 2008 audit,
“Unisa’s student throughput does not compare well with other open distance
learning institutions. This is a source of great concern for the Panel and an area
for improvement of which the institution is aware. The Panel is concerned that the
powerful social justice drive which defines Unisa’s access mandate might not be
realised if students cannot progress through their studies, and the institution cannot
produce a significant number of graduates to alleviate the country’s skills shortage
and contribute to social development” (Council on Higher Education 2010c).
The audit panel noted that “the organisational, financial and human resource
demands confronting Unisa from 2004 have been daunting”. While “the institution
has risen to all these challenges with energy and focus”, key aspects of the transition
process were incomplete: “the tensions of the merger resulted in a deterioration of
the relationship between management and academics. While to a large extent,
relations between management and academics have been restored, the Panel
found significant expressions of dissatisfaction among academic staff”. In particu-
lar, workloads were too high: “most academic staff members have too many
students to support and staff: student ratios in certain courses are far higher than
the college average. [. . .] the very ambitious nature of Unisa’s strategic objectives,
particularly in the area of research, might be putting an extraordinary load on staff”
(Council on Higher Education 2010c).
As with the University of South Africa, the announcement of the initial merger
that would establish the Cape Peninsula University of Technology had resulted in a
public political dispute. Although this had been long resolved by the time that the
HEQC audit was conducted in 2010, the new university had faced considerable
challenges, as the audit panel noted: “the multi-campus and demographically
diverse nature of the University pose challenges in the areas of student accommo-
dation, suitable educational facilities, and teaching and learning approaches to
support student success. The provision of an encompassing student experience
that involves residential and day students, and that extends from the lecture halls
and laboratories to other social spaces at each campus, is a fundamental challenge
for the University”. Given this, the panel believed that the “development of a new
academic identity and its concomitant institutional culture requires further reflec-
tion on issues such as student access and success and the necessary elements of an
appropriate student experience” (Council on Higher Education 2011c).
The fifth university in this category is the University of Fort Hare. Here, the
university’s identity had long been established with a proud reputation for
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educating future leaders; this had been the first university that Nelson Mandela had
attended. The merger had sought to widen Fort Hare’s scope through the incorpo-
ration of an urban campus in the coastal town of East London, which had previously
been part of Rhodes University. In comparison with the requirements of other
merging institutions, Fort Hare’s was a small merger mandate. However, and as
the HEQC noted in its report of its 2008 audit, merger had been required in addition
to ongoing recovery from near-catastrophe: “Fort Hare’s evolution in the last
10 years was marked by an institutional crisis which took the University to the
brink of collapse. Since 2000 UFH has been involved in a ‘turnaround’ strategy as a
result of which the institution has managed to re-establish governance structures,
achieved administrative stability, cleared its massive debt, and galvanised different
internal stakeholders into action around a common academic project” (Council on
Higher Education 2009b).
The Higher Education Merger Study Group has added a further perspective on
the completion of their monitoring of the Fort Hare merger, also in 2008. In the
merger, they reported, “even though programmes were complementary, two differ-
ent cultures were brought together. UFH Alice offered a full spectrum of
programmes to mostly residential students; students were often under-prepared
and from rural areas. The East London campus had a more diverse student body
of mostly non-residential, part-time, mature and working students, studying a
smaller range of programmes mostly at evening classes” (Gillard et al. 2012). In
the Study Group’s view, the full potential of the merger had yet to be realized. For
its part, the HEQC audit team saw the key requirement as finding “ways in which it
can conceptually and operationally reconcile its rural and urban orientations with-
out undermining the sustainability and development of the Alice campus” (Council
on Higher Education 2009b).
The five universities in this third category of new universities have key aspects
of their post-merger histories in common. All experienced a complex and ambiv-
alent start to their emergence as a new university, either because of significant prior
issues with which they had to contend (Durban University of Technology, Univer-
sity of Fort Hare), or because of high profile political disputes (Cape Peninsula
University of Technology, Unisa), or because of internal gridlock during the key,
initial years (Tshwane University of Technology). All of them carry major and
extensive responsibility for economically marginalized students and their commu-
nities, often with a broad geographical spread. In their new form, they depend on
breaking down the long established traditions of racial segregation and on building
new commitments and identities. While they may have faced imminent institutional
collapse (Tshwane University of Technology, Durban University of Technology,
University of Fort Hare), they have survived, and recovered from these crisis
interludes. All, though, will require more time before they can be said to have
achieved full realignment and integration as new universities.
Taken as a whole, then, the HEQC audit reports for nine of the 11 new univer-
sities that were created through the implementation of South Africa’s National Plan
for Higher Education in 2002 have, with varied degrees of success, established
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distinctive identities. In all cases, the post-merger phase of integration and consol-
idation remains incomplete. In some cases, it is clear that significantly more than a
decade will be needed before all the requirements of the merger are fully met.
8.5 Progress in Post-apartheid Reconstruction
Some patterns clearly emerge from the HEQC audit reports and the outcomes of
institution-specific studies. It is instructive to set these against the perceptions and
concerns that were recorded in interviews with managers and university leaders in
the first part of 2002 (Hall et al. 2004a).
Firstly, and most obviously, it is clear that the strength and extent of the assets of
the partners in the merger have had a significant influence on the outcome. Notably,
each in the set of more successful mergers included a “historically advantaged”
institution previously of university status. None of the remaining seven new
universities had this advantage. This meant that the distribution of assets across
the range of mergers varied enormously, from new buildings and facilities and cash
reserves to the consequences of sustained under-investment and already-existing
deficits. The risks that these circumstances presented had been very evident to those
interviewed in 2003, when there had been deep anxiety about the levels of funding
provided by government. The consequences of under-funding have been to perpet-
uate some of the discriminatory differentiation that had been the signature of
apartheid; those new universities, whose mission was primarily to provide oppor-
tunities for economically marginalized black students, continued to have the least
resourcing in capital investment and facilities.
This pattern of asset differentiation across the range of new universities appears
to have been a primary condition, which moderated the effects of other outcomes
from the merger process. Where a new university such as KwaZulu-Natal or the
North-West started off with a comparatively strong asset base it was more able to
mitigate other stresses, as the outcomes of the merger unfolded. The circumstances
faced by the new Walter Sisulu University, for example, were in stark contrast;
given the sustained marginalization of the University of Transkei and the rural
technikons that were brought together in the merger, and the extremes of poverty
across the Eastern Cape province, the new university did not have any buffer
against other issues that emerged.
Secondly, multi-campus mergers were particularly complicated – a distinctive
legacy from the apartheid years. Not surprisingly, the decision to reconstruct
Higher Education as a unitary system necessitated the rationalization of a complex
and dysfunctional dispersal of facilities. Again, this challenge had been fully
anticipated by university managers and leaders in 2003, who understood only too
well how difficult it would be to integrate campuses that could be more than 3 h
drive apart.
In some cases, this was less of an issue. The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University, for example, was forged for the most part out of two immediately
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adjacent campuses (while also incorporating a campus of the previous Vista
University). In contrast, the new North-West University had a particular challenge,
with each of three campuses more than 200 km from the other. The large new
Tshwane University of Technology was expected to unite six campuses spread
across four of the country’s nine provinces. And the University of Limpopo’s
mission was to bring together Medunsa’s urban campus in Pretoria with the former
University of the North’s campus at Turfloop, some 300 km away (South African
Government 2011a). Situations such as these presented significant difficulties in
terms of organizational systems, administrative structures, departmental, Faculty
and College structures and governance arrangements, particularly at Senate level.
Thirdly, it is clear in retrospect that strong and decisive initial responses to the
announcement of merger details tended to have a sustained influence on the post-
merger phase of integration. In 2003, some institutions were moving rapidly to set
up Merger Committees and appoint Merger Managers, and were using these as a
basis to begin practical collaboration with their merger partners. While there had
been persistent calls for guidance and resourcing from the Ministry and its embry-
onic Merger Unit, these institutions had not waited for these calls to be answered.
These strong responses appear to have brought sustained benefits, as the HEQC was
to note in several of its audit reports; for example, at the new universities of Fort
Hare, North-West and Johannesburg.
Conversely, political deadlock at the leadership level tended to be associated
with a slow and prolonged start to the merger process, and coincided with a longer
than anticipated process of post-merger integration (as reported for example, in the
HEQC audits of Unisa and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology). In
general terms, a sufficient minimum level of consensus appears necessary to
avoid disaster scenarios, presaged in South Africa’s regulatory system by Ministe-
rial intervention, the appointment of an Independent Assessor, the suspension of
normal governance and the appointment of an Administrator (all in terms of the
Higher Education Act). Both the Durban University of Technology and the
Tshwane University of Technology went to the brink of collapse but were able to
recover. In the case of the University of Limpopo, no consensus was achieved
between the merger partners and their leadership, and this merger has consequently
failed.
Fourthly, compliance with labour legislation has often been particularly difficult.
Again, this was widely anticipated in 2002/2003, both by government (in its
amendment of the Higher Education Act) and by merging institutions. Apartheid
segregation had created widely differing conditions of employment and consequent
expectations. Technikons and universities had differing professional requirements
of their staff and qualification structures. Behavioural differences tended to become
attenuated, from language choice (South Africa has 11 official languages) and dress
code, to parking arrangements. Both the HEQC audit reports and the Higher
Education Mergers Study Group overview stress the ongoing need to achieve the
harmonization of conditions of employment in the new universities. Where cir-
cumstances had deteriorated to the point where the Minister was obliged to appoint
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an Administrator, crippling industrial disputes were invariably a significant factor
in institutional breakdown.
Fifthly, educational mission and the alignment of academic programmes
and qualifications remains, in all cases, a substantial issue. There are two,
interlocked, issues here: the interpretation of the threefold differentiation between
traditional, comprehensive and technical universities introduced as part of the
merger policy, and the challenge of realigning all the academic programmes and
qualifications offered across a single new university. These challenges were fully
anticipated in 2002/2003. Those who were interviewed were concerned about the
capacity to meet merger requirements at the same time that the Ministry was
requiring academic programme and qualification alignment and regional collabo-
ration outside, and in parallel with, the merger processes.
Neither of the more successful of the new “traditional universities” (KwaZulu-
Natal and North-West) had achieved sufficient programme integration at the point
at which they were reviewed by either the Higher Education Mergers Study Unit or
the HEQC (in 2007 and 2009 respectively). For the “comprehensive universities”
the problem was compounded by the need to define this new category. Professor
Angina Parekh, a deputy vice-chancellor at the University of Johannesburg and
previously Head of the Department of Education’s Merger Unit, expressed this
problem candidly: “having done mergers, there now isn’t a very clear idea of what
the institutions are and how they should deliver on their mandate. It has been left to
universities to decide [. . .]” (Mgqibela 2008).
In addition to these five sets of issues that had been presaged in 2002 and 2003,
as preparations for the mergers were in full swing, there were additional dimensions
that may not have been sufficiently appreciated at the planning stage but which, in
retrospect, have been significant: institutional culture, the socio-economic context
in which specific universities must operate, and the challenge of bringing students
along with the objectives of the merger process.
Institutional culture can be understood as the combination of traditions, organi-
zational structures and group and individual behaviour that, together, come to
define a university’s identity. All the new universities were still facing substantial
challenges in this area, when visited by HEQC audit teams or by the Higher
Education Mergers Study Group, and this was often expressed by staff referring
back to institutional identities prior to the merger process. Where institutions got
into particular difficulties, requiring the appointment of an Independent Assessor
and Administrator, reports invariably point to a failure to establish a distinctive
sense of identity or purpose (see Arnolds et al. 2013).
As has been noted, South Africa is characterized by extreme income inequality.
Since the first universal elections of 1994, this income inequality has persisted, and
has been complicated by increased unemployment. At the same time, though, the
system-wide merger proposal adopted by government was cast as a national project
of reconstruction, seeking a unitary system of higher education comparable with
contemporary international standards. As the Higher Education Mergers Study
Group noted, this has encouraged “mission drift” in which prestige is granted to
research leadership and academic qualifications rather than in terms of responding
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to the needs of specific student populations. This policy framework may have
resulted in insufficient recognition (and therefore inappropriate resourcing and
expectations) of those new universities that would carry the primary burdens of
sustained and extensive inequality: universities serving large rural areas, sometimes
with urban campuses as well (Tshwane University of Technology, University of
Fort Hare, University of Limpopo, Walter Sisulu University of Science and Tech-
nology), and universities serving low income communities in South Africa’s three
sprawling urban metropolitan areas (Durban University of Technology, Cape
Peninsula University of Technology, University of Johannesburg).
Given the burden that all new universities have faced over the decade since
mergers were announced, those that were exempted from merger have had a
corresponding advantage. Some of these “old” universities were already facing
significant challenges in serving marginalized students and communities (Univer-
sity of the Western Cape, University of Zululand, University of Venda). Others
were already an elite group, and were the preference of the new black middle class
(University of Cape Town, University of Pretoria, Rhodes University, University of
Stellenbosch, University of the Witwatersrand). Given this, one consequence of the
merger process, at the system level, may have been to further exacerbate inequality
by increasing the premium value of admission to a local “Ivy League”.
Not surprisingly, students have strong views on this issue, given their primary
interest in educational outcomes. Those who are educationally qualified have
demanded – and received – admission to the small set of elite universities,
irrespective of their race. Those who have not had adequate qualifications for
admissions to highly selective institutions – overwhelmingly those from low
income families whose immediate forbearers had been the primary victims of
apartheid – readily appreciated that the universities that they could attend had far
fewer facilities, and that the educational qualifications that they would receive
would have significantly less value in the labour market. In consequence, it is not
surprising that they have tended to be angry and militant, and have often formed
alliances with disaffected employees. At both the Tshwane University of Technol-
ogy and the Walter Sisulu University of Science and Technology, student alliances
with trade unions directly led to the suspension of autonomous governance and the
appointment of an Administrator.
In general terms, student distance from the merger process was captured in
debates at the South African Students Congress (SASCO) conference in 2009.
The new universities created by the mergers were seen as having failed the
requirements of the labour market. Patterns of graduate unemployment showed
that previous patterns of discrimination and disadvantage had continued despite the
merger process, and employers remained prejudiced against black graduates from
disadvantaged backgrounds. Overall, SASCO saw the impact and outcomes of the
mergers as unclear and called for a Commission of Inquiry to review the process
and its consequences (SASCO 2009).
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8.6 Conclusions
How successful, then, have Higher Education mergers been in South Africa? In
drawing some conclusions from both the perspective of systemic national-level and
institutional structure and of students, the pervasive effects of inequality permeate
all aspects of both the mergers and the subsequent fortunes of both the new
universities and those that were exempt from merger (Hall 2012a, b).
South Africa has long had, and continues to have, one of the highest levels of
income inequality in the world (Seekings and Nattrass 2005; Statistics South Africa
2008). As in other countries, variations in household income have a direct affect on
educational attainment. In 2007, just under one million young South Africans were
eligible to enter the final examinations for compulsory education (the Matriculation
Examination), 83 % of whom were African and 7 % were White. 35 % of the
African candidates and 64 % of the White candidates wrote the examinations and
passed. Of these, 34 % of the White candidates achieved an endorsement: the
minimum grades in specified combinations of subjects to be eligible to apply for
higher education. Only 6 % of African candidates achieved an endorsement. In
South Africa, an A-aggregate is required for the most selective university
programmes. One in 11 White candidates achieved an A-aggregate. This was
matched by just one in 640 African candidates. As many commentators have
noted, despite government focus on resourcing, South Africa’s schools chronically
underperform compared to similar emerging economies (Hall 2012a, b).
This pattern of inequality results in a distinctive “articulation gap” – the signa-
ture of South African schooling, and of subsequent opportunities after compulsory
education (Council on Higher Education 2013a). In consequence, universities face
widely different challenges. The level of educational attainment, material resources
and expectations of a student enrolling at the University of Cape Town are very
different from those of a student entering the Tshwane University of Technology.
Any evaluation of the comparative success of universities in South Africa has to
take account of the continuing, material effects of pronounced inequality.
But, significant as it is, continuing inequality does not fully account for graduate
outcomes across South Africa’s Higher Education system. This has been confirmed
by the first system-wide study of student access to all South Africa’s public
universities and students’ subsequent fortunes and levels of success. The core of
this analysis is the student cohort that entered Higher Education in 2006, the first
academic year following the completion of the merger process. This has shown that,
while the effects of inequality are evident, underperformance by students from
privileged backgrounds entering the most selective universities is also prevalent: “It
is clear that systemic problems affect the whole school system, the functional and
well-resourced schools, as well as the dysfunctional and poorly-resourced ones”.
No socioeconomic or racially-defined group is performing well, and more than a
third of the best performing group – white students mainly studying at well-
resourced, traditional universities – fail to graduate within 5 years (Council on
Higher Education 2013a).
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Given these continuing challenges, then, has the reorganization of
South Africa’s higher education system broken the “structural embrace” of apart-
heid architecture, rooted in colonial education systems and formalized under the
National Party governments of 1948–1990?
In one sense, this has evidently been the case, as the universities that the newly
elected government inherited in 1994 were impossibly compromised. This was
apparent through successive studies by the Council on Higher Education and in the
recommendations brought together in the National Plan for Higher Education.
Although there had been both the relaxation of regulations, and reforms, in the
1980s, it must be recalled that everything about South Africa’s universities had
been shaped by the practices and objectives of racial segregation. As Hendrik
Verwoerd – then Minister of Native Affairs, later Prime Minister – had put it in
1953: “there is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level
of certain forms of labour [. . .] What is the use of teaching the Bantu child
mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?” (Clark and Worger 2011).
Indeed, one criticism could be that the merger project did not go far enough. The
National Commission on Higher Education, which had reported in 1996, had seen
the whole system as dysfunctional; however, the proposals adopted by the govern-
ment in 2002 left eight existing universities unchanged. The overview of the HEQC
audit reports in this chapter suggests that a successful merger outcome has, a decade
later, been associated with there being a strong partner in the process; in other
words, a university that had been differentially favoured through the apartheid
years. What would have happened if each of the Universities of Cape Town, Free
State, Pretoria, Stellenbosch and Witwatersrand had been required to merge with a
partner that had been reserved for black South Africans in the apartheid schema?
The decision to exclude a significant number of existing institutions has clearly
diminished the overall effect of the merger process. This can be expressed through
the proxy of undergraduate headcount enrolments in 2011 – the fifth year following
the admission of the 2006 cohort, which has been analysed by the Council on
Higher Education (Council on Higher Education 2013a). Headcount enrolments for
all universities are given in Table 8.1. Excluding Unisa’s distance education
enrolments, only 51 % of these students were registered in merged institutions.
Within this group of new universities, 25 % of total headcount enrolments were
registered in the four “strong” mergers. A further 19 % were enrolled in the four
“unresolved” mergers and 7 % were in the two failed mergers. In practice, this
means that only a quarter of all 2011 undergraduate students were in truly “new”
universities. This is not the extensive restructuring that had been recommended by
the National Commission on Higher Education in 2001.
A second way of evaluating the overall merger process at the system level is in
terms of national workforce planning; the provision of sufficient, and appropriately
qualified, graduates for South Africa’s present and future needs.
On the one hand, the overall size of the Higher Education system has continued
to grow. Overall enrolment has increased by over 80 % since 1994, to a total
enrolment of over 900,000. This expansion has contributed to redressing racial
inequities, with African enrolments reaching 79 % of total enrolments by 2010, and
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the number of African first-degree graduates growing by 50 % between 1995 and
2010 (Council on Higher Education 2013a). Whether or not this gross expansion
would have happened without mergers is of course unknowable; clearly, though,
mergers have not impeded overall expansion. In 2012, the government published a
new National Development Plan. This has called for this expansion to continue, and
to result in ten million graduates in 2030 (one in every six people), in contrast with
2001, when there were 2.6 graduates in the South African populations as a whole,
one in every 17 people (Government of South Africa 2012).
Despite this overall growth, the National Development Plan is explicit in its
criticisms of the suitability of the country’s graduates for national workforce
requirements: “the data on the quality of university education is disturbing.
South African universities are mid-level performers in terms of knowledge produc-
tion, with low participation, high attrition rates and insufficient capacity to produce
the required levels of skills. They are still characterised by historical inequities and
distortions. The university sector is under considerable strain. Enrolments have
almost doubled in 18 years, yet the funding has not kept up, resulting in slow growth
in the number of university lecturers, inadequate student accommodation, creaking
university infrastructure and equipment shortages. The number of institutions that
have recently been put under administration is an indication of the leadership and
governance challenges” (South African Government 2012).
These deficits have been examined in detail by the Council on Higher Educa-
tion’s Task Team on undergraduate curricula structure (Council on Higher
Education 2013a). When considered in terms of participation rates (using the
standard Gross Enrolment Ratio), the targets set in the 2001 National Plan for
Higher Education have been met, increasing from 15 % in 2000 to 18 % in 2010.
However, pronounced racial inequalities persist. While white participation is com-
parable with developed country levels, the participation rate for black students is
persistently low. The task team concluded: “the output of higher education is not
meeting the country’s needs [. . .] the system has low internal efficiency in utilising
human and material resources (and consequently does not provide a sound basis for
growth), and [. . .] the scale of the failure and dropout occurring within a small and
selected student body points to substantial systemic problems that require systemic
responses. It can be said that, in relation to its educational role, higher education in
South Africa is a ‘low-participation, high-attrition system’ [. . .] that has not yet
come to terms with its developing-country environment” (Council on Higher
Education 2013a).
At the overall system level, then, outcomes of mergers have been mixed. What is
still unclear is what will emerge from the five remaining, new universities that have
certainly not failed, but which were still implementing key aspects of their mergers
at the time of their HEQC audit reports. Leaving aside the special case of the Unisa,
these are the Durban University of Technology, the Tshwane University of Tech-
nology, the Cape Peninsula University of Technology and the University of Fort
Hare. Two are metropolitan, and two span the complex spread of urban and rural
catchments. Three are universities of technology. Given their particular missions,
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they can be seen as bellwethers for the future success of the education objectives set
out in the 2012 National Development Plan.
The comparative success of individual institutions, as suggested in their HEQC
audit reports, has already been described in terms of the availability of assets and
financing, the challenges of multi-campus mergers, the alignment of academic
programmes and qualifications, and institutional culture. These factors have evi-
dently shaped patterns of success over the years following merger. In addition, a
key aspect of the 2002 merger plan was a national mix of three kinds of institution:
traditional universities, comprehensive universities, and universities of technology.
To what extent has this trio of institutional types been consolidated as definitive of
South African Higher Education? Again, the 2011 headcount enrolments shown in
Table 8.1 can be as a proxy for the mix of post-merger institutional types. Turning
now to this institutional level, which sets of conditions that were discernable at the
beginning of the merger process in 2002 appear to have driven degrees of success
over the following decade?
Firstly, and significantly, a third of all registered undergraduate students are with
Unisa. For South Africa’s very large distance provider, the breaking revolution in
digitally-enabled, blended and on-line learning will have more significance than the
new institutional models created by the 2002 merger plan. This will be a significant
challenge, as is evident from the Council on Higher Education’s analysis of the
fortunes of the 2006 student cohort. For Unisa, the rates of attrition within 4 years of
the expected completion time were 67 % for 3-year degrees (in other words,
allowing 7 years for completion), 67 % for 4-year degrees (allowing 8 years for
completion), and 86 % for 3-year diplomas (allowing 7 years for completion)
(Council on Higher Education 2013a). Given this, there is an evident category
error in regarding Unisa as a comprehensive university of similar type to, for
example, the University of Johannesburg or the University of Venda. Distance
provision in South Africa needs to be considered as a category of its own. This
has been recognized in the 2012 National Development Plan. As a priority for
investment through to 2030, the NPD notes the need to expand, and invest in
distance education: “the advances in ICT can help overcome the infrastructure
limits to further expansion of higher education. Upfront investment is needed in
technology, curriculum design, quality assurance and monitoring” (South African
Government 2012).
Secondly, when Unisa registrations were excluded, the distribution of 2011
headcount enrolments were 53 % in traditional universities, 21 % in comprehensive
universities and 26 % in universities of technology. When the pre-reform distribu-
tion of assets and institutional capabilities is also taken into account, it is clear that
the traditional university remains the overwhelmingly dominant form of higher
education in South Africa. This is mirrored in patterns of state expenditure.
Government accounts confirm that ZAR2.8bn ($346 m) was spent on mergers
over five successive funding years, beginning in 2004. This money was retained
in the overall Higher Education budget, while being reallocated to fund infrastruc-
ture and efficiency grants from 2008 onwards (with an allocation of ZAR1.1bn in
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2008/9, growing to ZAR1.6bn in 2011/12 – an increase from $134 m to $186 m).2
Since this funding was available to all universities, this allocation policy has had the
effect of further diminishing financial support available for the experiment with
comprehensive universities and universities of technology, and of buttressing the
comparative strength of traditional universities. Indeed, the primary importance of
traditional universities is endorsed and emphasized by the National Planning
Commission in its proposals that look forward to 2030 (Government of
South Africa 2013a).
Thirdly, as the National Development Plan makes clear, the present and future
needs of universities require far greater attention to the articulation between the
school system, further education and vocational provision. In considering the
success of the 2002 merger plan, this puts a spotlight on universities of technology
and comprehensive universities as institutional types. How effective have they been
in ensuring an effective spectrum of provision across all aspects of post-compulsory
provision?
In total, the 2002 policy established six technical universities, three through
mergers, and from a set of ten preceding technikons. Excluding Unisa, five com-
prehensive universities were established at the same time, three from mergers
between previous technikons and traditional universities, and two by
re-designating earlier, traditional universities that had, during the apartheid years,
been set up for ethnically defined black “homelands” (Table 8.1). The mission
intended for these 11 institutions was to span the distinction between vocational and
academic qualifications, by means of a range of diplomas and degrees. It had been
clear from the interviews carried out in early 2003 that there was little clarity as to
how these broad intentions should, or could, be implemented at the level of the
individual institution. The subsequent HEQC audit reports show that this lack of
clarity often persisted after the mergers had been completed.
The mix of qualifications attained across the Higher Education system as a
whole is reflected in the relative proportions of 3 year degrees and vocational
diplomas. In 2001, when the merger process was launched, the ratio of degrees to
diplomas was 55:45. By 2011 the overall number of graduates with these two types
of qualification had increased by 71 %. However the ratio of degrees to diplomas
was still 55:45.3 This suggests that, contrary to intention, the merger process has
had at best no effect on rebalancing the overall proportions of vocational and
academic qualifications that have been attained.
Overall, there is no evidence that the comprehensive university, as a new
institutional type, has emerged as a strong identity. Given this, it is telling that
the 2012 National Development Plan all but ignores the merger process of a decade
earlier and, in addressing the challenge of articulation between vocational and
academic provision, simply restates the problem that the National Commission on
2Higher Education and Training, University State Budgets. Jane Hendry, personal communica-
tion, 17 October 2013.
3 National HEMIS data base; Jane Hendry, personal communication, 17 October 2013.
168 M. Hall
Higher Education had addressed in 2001: “building an expanded, differentiated
university system requires that other post-school institutions function optimally. If
the college sector functions optimally, the pressure on universities to offer lower
level diplomas and certificates will be reduced. This will allow universities to focus
on their niche” (South African Government 2012).
Fourthly, this highlights the particular consequences of the failure to focus on
curriculum reform as a central pillar of the 2002 merger plan. Interviews in 2003
showed a near-universal concern about academic programme reform, and articula-
tion and subsequent HEQC audit reports have, in several cases, highlighted the
problems that have followed as a consequence. At one extreme is the University of
Limpopo, where the failure to align the educational missions of the two institutions
entering the merger has been formally credited as the reason for the failure of the
merger process. More prevalently, universities of technology and comprehensive
universities have found it difficult to integrate very different kinds of curriculum
structure.
The most recent Council on Higher Education’s investigation hints that the
considerable institutional effort that has been put into tackling this problem may
have yielded some positive results. The Council’s report notes that, contrary to a
general trend of deteriorating quality of student results, there have been improve-
ments in achievement by students studying for diplomas: “in some cases, the
institutional mergers coming into effect at that time may have focused attention
on educational management, but it is not clear what short-term improvements they
may have brought about in teaching and learning” (Council on Higher Education
2013a). However, the overwhelming conclusion of the task team is that
South Africa’s undergraduate curriculum structure is beyond repair, and needs
comprehensive revision. As with the work of the National Planning Commission,
the task team barely mentions the 2002 merger plan, and rather refers back to the
1997 White Paper as its reference point for essential changes to the higher educa-
tion system.
Overall then, it seems that the implementation of the 2002 merger plan has had
little sustained effect on institutional forms and structures. While, within institu-
tions, considerable work has been put into interpreting what technical and compre-
hensive universities should be in distinction to traditional universities, institution
structures long-established before the adoption of the merger plan have remained
dominant. The most recent policy documents, including the country’s formally
adopted National Development Plan that is intended to shape government policy
over the next two decades, all but ignore the merger process and revert to the earlier
challenges of recovery from the apartheid years.
From the student perspective, to what extent has the merger process contributed
to addressing access and subsequent levels of success – who gets in, and how do
they get on? More specifically is there any evidence, from the experience of the first
post-merger student cohort that enrolled in 2006, that the mergers have made a
difference?
The cohort analysis commissioned by the Council on Higher Education shows a
pattern of high overall undergraduate attrition. Five years after entering, only 35 %
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of the 2006 cohort had graduated (45 % when UNISA students are set to one side).
For traditional 3 and 4 year undergraduate degree programmes only 52 % of the
2006 entering cohort had graduated after 5 years; the completion rate for diplomas
after 5 years was only 42 %; particularly significant for the missions of the new
comprehensive universities and universities of technology.
Equity, the representivity of the population as a whole in the profile of graduates,
is also an important indicator of the extent to which universities are meeting the
legitimate expectations of their students. While remaining low, 5-year completion
rates for African students increased significantly when the fortunes of the 2000 and
2006 cohorts are compared (to the extent that data are available). In addition, the
average gap between the African and white 5-year completion rates narrowed
appreciably from the 2000 to the 2006 cohort, although this was in part due to a
deterioration in the white completion rate. However, these changes pre-date the
implementation of mergers and the overall situation is still that only 5 % of young
black South Africans are succeeding in higher education (Council on Higher
Education 2013a).
As far as students are concerned, then, the effects of the merger process seem to
be at best neutral. Have mergers damaged student prospects? Has the amount of
scare institutional resources diverted to merger processes, the problems of “pipe-
line” students identified back in 2002 and the lack of a focus on curriculum reform
detracted from improving teaching and providing student support? Here, a rough
proxy is the proportion of students enrolled in universities where difficulties have
been sufficient to require direct ministerial interventions in terms of the Higher
Education Act. This has happened in four cases, with headcount enrolments in 2011
of just under 122,000 students, or 20 % of the country’s total undergraduate student
enrolment, excluding Unisa students. Disruptions of this magnitude would have a
considerable impact on any country’s Higher Education system, and all the more so
through a period of national reconstruction following sustained and institutional-
ized discrimination.
Overall – and bringing together effects at the levels of the national system,
individual universities and student expectations – South Africa’s Higher Education
mergers have probably been irrelevant to the long-term process of recovery from
the apartheid years. Trends evident prior to the implementation of the 2002 merger
plan have continued despite the merger process. While it has been important to
dismantle to visible manifestations of apartheid, such as segregated campuses, the
correlation between wide differences in access to educational facilities and race and
economic circumstances are still only too evident.
In January 2005, both the Walter Sisulu University of Technology and Science
and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University were inaugurated, named for the
two iconic leaders of opposition to apartheid. In January 2013, students enrolling at
these universities had very different backgrounds and experiences, and will have
widely divergent prospects. In this, the core objective of reform of Higher Educa-
tion in South Africa, as expressed in the 1997 White Paper, remains unrealized:
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the higher education system must be planned, governed and funded as a single national
coordinated system. This will enable us to overcome the fragmentation, inequality and
inefficiency which are the legacy of the past, and create a learning society which releases
the creative and intellectual energies of all our people towards meeting the goals of
reconstruction and development (South African Government 1997a).
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